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Abstract  
  
This paper studies the decentralization process of public 
spending in Spain, which has been one of the main landmarks in 
recent years, and not only in Spain but also in many different 
countries. The classical assumption to speak about this kind of 
processes is the theory of fiscal federalism. However, nowadays this 
theory is considered more as a set of general "guidelines" than a 
practical rule of application. 
 
To undertake this study the article proposes a new method to 
describe the outcomes of the decentralization process through the 
functional classification of spending. The analysis of the data in each 
level of government -central, regional and local- is made in order to 
justify the process. So far, mainly political motives have justified the 
transference of competencies from the central to the regional and local 
governments in Spain. The fiscal federalism theory can enlighten our 
analysis from a theoretical point of view. 
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1. Introduction 
 
To decentralize or not to decentralize? That is the question. 
Although literature presents arguments supporting both these 
tendencies, (1) there is not doubt that in recent years one can see 
worldwide interest in fiscal decentralization: "In Europe, the former 
Soviet Union, South Africa, and elsewhere, the view that effective 
government will involve a well-chosen mix of local and central 
government decision-making is now accepted" (Inman and Rubinfeld, 
1997: p. 43) The author includes below some comments that try to 
justify decentralization in different groups of countries. 
 
In the case of developing countries, where the process of 
decentralization seems to be a common characteristic (Oates, 1993, 
1999), they justify the process as "one possible way of escaping from 
the traps of ineffective and inefficient governance, macroeconomic 
instability, and inadequate economic growth" (Bird and Vaillancourt, 
2000: p. 1) In this sense, some authors believe that decentralization is 
a real cause of economic development (see Campbell et al., 1991, 
Oates, 1997) However, most of them point out that, without a 
previous regional and local government structure, decentralization 
could provoke even greater inequity and macroeconomic instability 
(Bahl and Linn, 1994, Prud'homme, 1995)   
 
In a way, countries in transition in eastern and central Europe 
are also trying to approximate first world countries  by applying 
decentralization processes (Bird et al., 1995, Stewart, 2000) As said 
earlier, problems also appear in developing countries, for example, in 
Russia decentralization "has led to growing disparities in the 
provision of government services across regions, and in particular in 
the provision of education" (Stewart, 2000: p. 143) 
 
Developed countries are leading the decentralization 
processes (Prud'homme, 1991, Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997, 1998) The 
objective here is not a greater macroeconomic stability, but a 
reshaping of their intergovernmental fiscal structure by trying to 
attend the requirements of the new «post-welfare state», where 
citizens demand goods and services coming from a close Public Sector 
(Wildasin, 1997) In this sense, decentralization is actively working in 
Europe. (2) Central levels of government are transferring power to 
the regional and local governments. Spain is one of the most striking 
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examples. In this country, the issue of decentralization is moving 
very fast. In recent years, this country is showing a similar situation 
to others with more federalist traditions, like Germany or 
Switzerland. With respect to Austria and Belgium, regional 
governments are even controlling bigger quantities of spending. 
Spain is clearly a country more decentralized, either from revenue or 
expenditure point of view, than France. For more information 
comparing decentralization process in Spain with others developed 
countries see (Ochando and Toboso, 2000, IMF, 1999, Miñana Simó, 
1999, Bel and Castells, 1991) It is the objective of this research to go 
deeper in studying the decentralization of public spending in Spain. 
 
The article will follow four steps. First, it explains the fiscal 
federalism theory, exploring afterwards the regional and local 
governments in Spain, its laws, different legal functions, and 
competencies. Next, it discusses, among others issues, the 
methodology used, the period of study: 1984-1997, and the available 
statistics. After assembling the data, the study describes and justifies 
the decentralization process of public spending during the chosen 
period in each level of government. The article ends with some 
concluding observations. 
 
2. The fiscal federalism theory: a practical rule 
or some general “guidelines”? 
 
Generally speaking, fiscal federalism (3) is a study of the 
interrelations that occur in the public revenues and spending 
between levels of Public Administration (Domingo Solans, 1977) 
However, the relationship among decentralization and federalism is 
not an easy issue to discuss. (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997, 1998) 
describe three Principles of Federalism  depending on how central 
government policies are decided upon: 
 
The principle of economic federalism, or centralized federalism, 
prefers the most decentralized structure of government capable of 
internalizing all economic externalities, subject to the constitutional 
constraint that all central government policies be decided by an 
elected or appointed "central planner".  
 
Also the principle of cooperative federalism, or decentralized 
federalism, prefers the most decentralized structure of government, 
but here all central government policies are agreed upon 
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unanimously by the elected representatives from each of the lower-
tier governments. As is pointed out in section number 3 of this paper, 
the decentralization process in Spain is working, in some sense, 
according to this kind of federalism.  
 
In the case of The principle of democratic (or majority-rule) 
federalism  all central government policies are agreed upon by a 
simple (51 percent) majority of elected representatives from lower-
tier governments. Nowadays, the European Union is following this 
kind of federalism, combining it with centralized and decentralized 
federalism for some aspects (Ruiz Álvarez, 1999) 
 
According to (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997: p. 45), among these 
three Principles of Federalism mentioned above, (Musgrave's 1959) 
and (Oates's, 1972) classic Fiscal Federalism Theory (4) still provides 
the most complete description of economic federalism. Basically, this 
theory has its economic grounds on "the voluntary exchange theory of 
public economics" of (Musgrave, 1939), "the theory of collective 
goods", from the contribution of (Samuelson, 1954), and "the fiscal 
migrations theory" of (Tiebout, 1956) The traditional fiscal federalism 
theory has become the most important among the fiscal theories, 
with wider diffusion in economic circles. This led it to being named 
as a orthodox theory among economists (Casahuga, 1978) Because of 
this, the author will then offer a brief description of this theory. 
 
The traditional theory of fiscal federalism calls for a general 
normative framework for the assignment of functions to different 
levels of government as well as the appropriate fiscal instruments for 
carrying out these functions (Oates, 1999) (5) Taking into account this 
framework, central governments would have primary responsibility 
for two of the three functions which any government must provide: 
income redistribution and macroeconomic stabilization. Meanwhile, 
each level of government (in Spain: central, regional or local) would 
carry out part of the function of allocation, that is, the "provision of 
goods and services whose consumption is limited to their own 
jurisdictions" (Oates, 1999: p. 1121)  
 
The income redistribution function must be largely in the 
hands of the central government, otherwise, problems may appear. 
For example, if one lower level of government applies any kind of 
income redistribution within its jurisdiction, this measure can easily 
cause positive or negative external effects in other territories. In 
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addition, population interjurisdictional movements can appear and 
counteract redistribution measures. The same problem can happen 
with the mobility of taxable factors. Moreover (Oates, 1972, King, 
1984, Gramlich, 1987, Feldstein and Wrobel, 1998) support that the 
aforementioned problems could appear. They do not believe on the 
success of redistribution functions in any lower government hand. 
However, opinions from different authors are divided. (Pauly, 1973) 
says that, in practice, state (regional in Spain) and local governments 
carry out significant redistribution activity. (Goodspeed, 1989), in one 
study for the U.S.A., points out that local governments can use 
income taxation for redistribution purposes. 
 
In the same way, the macroeconomic stabilization function 
must primarily be in central government hands (Oates, 1972, 
Castells, 1988, Begg et al., 1993) The control over some national 
variables (interest rate, prices, exchange rate, unemployment rate, 
etc) can not be entrusted to lower government control. And the same 
conclusion should be addressed for the fiscal and monetary policies, 
and the public debt. However, some authors say that stabilization 
could be considered as a public good with a important geographic 
dimension. In this sense, each region could handle better its own 
stabilization function, according to different preferences and grades 
of development, and also different productive specialization between 
regions (see, for instance, Pauly, 1973, Head, 1976)  
 
With respect to the function of allocation (a good summary of 
this function can be found in Carpio, 1994, Castells, 1988), the 
problem is that it is not always easy to find the most effective level of 
government for the provision of the different goods and services. (6) 
In this sense, many authors point out that the solution would come 
from the construction of an "optimal allocation table" between the 
whole quantity of goods and services, which the public sector must 
provide, and the different jurisdictional levels providing these 
services. For the construction of that "table", it would be necessary 
take into account several principles: 
 
The decentralization theorem: if there are neither cost savings 
in the centralized provision, nor inter-jurisdictional external effects; 
the welfare level will be the same or higher, if the provision comes 
from the decentralized governments. That is, a presumption exists in 
favor of the decentralized provision of such public goods and services 
(Tiebout, 1956, Oates, 1972, 1997, 1999) 
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The principle of "fiscal equivalence" (Olson, 1969): the objective 
would be to reach the coincidence between the geographic area of the 
public good benefits and the jurisdictional area where the 
government provides that public good. 
 
The theory of optimal jurisdictional size  (Buchanan, 1965, (7) 
Berglas, 1976, Berglas and Pines, 1981, Scotchmer and Wooders, 
1987, Brueckner, 1994): for not fully public goods, this theory tries to 
determine the population volume who maximizes benefits and 
minimizes costs in the provision of these public goods, for one 
constant real provision level. 
 
The "optimal allocation table", described above, tries to find 
the appropriate degree of decentralization for every country, within 
the function of an allocation context. In other words, this table tries 
to understand which goods and services are best centralized and 
which are best placed in the sphere of decentralized levels of 
government. But, this being a complex issue brings us closer to the 
question section 2’ of the paper poses: the fiscal federalism theory: a 
practical rule or some general "guidelines"?  
 
Criticism against traditional theory of fiscal federalism 
started very early. Already in 1978, (Casahuga, 1978) pointed out that 
distribution of functions among levels of government is impossible to 
apply in the real world as rigid as the fiscal federalism theory 
suggests. Moreover, the "optimal allocation table" would be far from a 
real normative rule. With regards to the distribution of functions 
complexity, (Helm and Smith, 1987: p. VIII) say that the 
"theoretically appealing separation of efficiency and distribution is 
however less straightforward in practice. Most of the relevant 
services are mixed goods -part public and part distributional-". But, 
even one of its main authors, (Oates, 1999: p. 1122), says that the 
fiscal federalism theory "does not offer a precise delineation of the 
specific goods and services to be provided at each level of 
government"; if so, its precepts then "should be regarded more as 
general guidelines than firm principles". 
 
Nowadays, authors like (Qian and Weingast, 1997: p. 91) are 
offering a new theory of federalism, which complement traditional 
approaches. They, among others, appeal "to the theory of the firm to 
address a range of problems in federal system ignored by traditional 
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theories". However, neither these new attempts are suggesting some 
practical rule to decentralize more properly from the central to the 
lower levels of government. In any case, and as we will see in the 
Spanish case, decentralization can not follow concrete rules, since it 
occurs in each particular country, "with its own history and 
traditions and its own specific institutional, political, and economic 
context" (Bird and Vaillancourt, 2000: p. 2) But, precisely because 
traditional fiscal federalism theory is not a practical rule, it could 
continue being useful: it is, for the moment, the best general 
guideline trying to enlighten decentralization processes. In this sense 
the author will mention it in section 5 of this paper. 
 
3. Regional and local governments in Spain 
 
Before going further, it is necessary to describe the structure 
of the lower levels of government in Spain, (8) that is: Autonomous 
Communities (hereafter A.C.), and Local Corporations (hereafter 
L.C.) 
 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 (see López Guerra, 1987, 
Alzaga Villamil, 1978) establishes a special kind of organization for 
the Spanish State, neither purely federal, nor centralized; it is called 
"Cooperative Federalism" (9) (Jiménez Arias and Lagos Rodríguez, 
1992), in which the main new element is the birth of the A.C. In 
addition to the provinces and the towns, the A.C. constitute the basic 
structure of the territorial organization of the State. The change from 
a centralized state to a decentralized one takes time; it is a slow and 
difficult process that is still not finished in Spain (Torres Cobo, 1990)  
 
The seventeen A.C. (10) of Spain are divided in different 
groups, taking into account different aspects. There is more detailed 
information about that in (López López and Utrilla, 2000: pp. 165-191, 
Suárez Pandiello: 1999, pp. 222-254, Brosio, 1997: pp. 221-233, 
Paniagua Soto and Alvarado Pérez, 1997, Tamames, 1995) 
 
According to the way each one became an autonomous region 
and their responsibilities, one can distinguish two groups. 
 
The first group is named the slow way in Article143 of the 
Spanish Constitution or A.C. with low level of responsibilities. These 
regions (with clearly shorter historical backgrounds as independent 
regions) would not assume the competencies from Article 148 
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immediately, but only after five years (even longer in practice) Ten 
regions used the slow way: Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y León, 
Aragón, Extremadura, Cantabria, Asturias, La Rioja, Islas Baleares, 
Murcia and Madrid. 
 
The summary of the competencies for this group of A.C. (called 
"common competencies") is included below. Some references about 
competencies for this group of A.C., and also L.C., are (Monasterio 
Escudero and Suárez Pandiello, 1998, Torres Cobo, 1995, López 
Guerra, 1987 –Spanish Constitution of 1978, Article 148-) 
 
- Self-government institutions.  
- Some competencies from the Central Administration over the 
Local Corporations. 
- Forestry, agriculture, stockbreeding and fishing. 
- Dwelling and city planning.  
- Roads.  
- Ports and airports without trade activity.  
- Hydraulic issues, channels and irrigated land. 
- Environmental protection. 
- Regional traditions: culture, museums, exhibitions, etc. 
 
The second group is called historic nationalities from Article 
151 of the Spanish Constitution or A.C. with high level of 
responsibilities. These regions assumed immediately all the 
competencies prescribed in Article 148. From this group (also called 
"fast way"), the following regions -7- became A.C.: País Vasco, 
Cataluña, Galicia, Andalucía, Comunidad Valenciana and Islas 
Canarias. Navarra used a different way, but also with full 
competencies.  
 
Besides the "common competencies" described for the first 
group, this group of A.C. (with "full competencies") include the 
following competencies: 
 
- Education in all its branches. 
- Social Security (medical care and social assistance-non 
contribute pensions-) 
- Justice and Public Order. 
- A wide set of competencies in: Labor, Agriculture and Public 
Works. 
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With respect to the competencies described in the previous 
paragraphs, and according to Article 148.2 of the Spanish 
Constitution, the first group of A.C. would assume "full 
competencies" in five years, which would have been in 1983. But, 
even after law 9 of December 23, 1992, called "transfer of 
competencies to the regions that became A.C. through the Article 143 
of the Constitution", the process has been slower. For more 
information about that process, I recommend (Aranzadi, 1993-2000, 
Dirección General de Coordinación con las Haciendas Territoriales, 
2000: p. 30, Molero, 1998: pp. 115-119) In this sense, nowadays the 
situation is: 
 
- Communities included in the first group still have not 
received competencies in medical care and justice and public 
order. 
 
- All of them have received the social assistance competence -
non contribute pensions- and other competencies of minor 
importance. 
 
- Also education (11) in all its branches has been transferred to 
these A.C. 
 
According to their financing system (see Suárez Pandiello, 
1999: p. 204), there are two Foral regime communities (Navarra and 
País Vasco), which have a special and more autonomous regime of 
finance. The rest of A.C. -15- have a Common regime of finance, with a 
general (but fundamentally dependent on the central government) 
system. 
 
According to the number of provinces in their territory (see 
Suárez Pandiello, 1999: p. 204), one finds 6 one-province communities 
where provincial governments do not exist and regional governments 
habe assumed their responsibilities (Asturias, Cantabria, Madrid, 
Murcia, Navarra and La Rioja) The rest of A.C. -11- are multi-
province communities where provincial governments exist and 
assume their own responsibilities. 
 
In Spain Local Corporations (also known as "Local Entities" or 
"Local Public Sector") (12) include the following entities: towns 
(about 8.063), provinces -50-,(13) islands, metropolitan areas, 
districts, autonomous cities (14) (Ceuta and Melilla), and other local 
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entities (associations, towns grouping, and minor local entities) 
According to the available information and because of their large 
amount of spending (see Dirección General de Coordinación con las 
Haciendas Territoriales, 1999: p. 9), only some of them will be 
included in the study on local public spending: towns, provinces, 
islands, and autonomous cities (until 1996) (15) Therefore, the paper 
refers only to these four entities in the statistics. 
 
Before a brief description of the competencies given to the 
main entities that compose the L.C. (towns and provinces), (16) some 
explanation is needed (some important references about the 
competencies for the L.C. are Ballesteros Fernández, 1994, Font I 
Llovet, 1992, Cosculluela Montaner and others, 1992, Mir I Bago, 
1991, Ortega, 1988, Sosa Wagner and De Miguel García, 1985) First, 
an important difference to consider is that the A.C. have political 
autonomy and can issue laws for their self-government; this is not so 
for the L.C., which have only a role of administrative management. 
Furthermore, neither the Constitution of 1978, nor the Statutes of 
Autonomy were very specific with respect to the competencies of the 
L.C. For instance, the Constitution established just a general 
"guideline" for them (Sosa Wagner and De Miguel García, 1985: p. 10) 
Lastly, there are different kinds of competencies that can be assumed 
for the L.C.: proper, attributed, or shared competencies (there is a 
good summary of the competencies for the L.C. in Molero, 1998: pp. 
123-124) 
 
  According to Articles 31.2 and 36.1 of the Spanish Constitution 
and the "Regulating Local Regime Law" (RLRL), the competencies of 
the province are: (17) 
 
- Those that guarantee the principles of solidarity and 
equilibrium for the towns, within a framework of economic and 
social policy. 
 
- The ones attributed by laws from the central government or 
the A.C.: 
1) Co-ordination of municipal services to guarantee an 
adequate level of services. 
2) Legal, economic and technical aid to municipalities, 
particularly to those with reduced economic and 
management capacity. 
3) The provision of supra-municipal public services.  
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4) The fostering and administering of the specific 
interest of the province. 
 
Article 25.1 of the Spanish Constitution says: "The town, in 
order to manage its own interests and within the area of its 
competencies, can promote any sort of activities and provide any 
public services, which contribute to satisfy the necessities and 
aspirations of the community". That means a concrete group of 
competencies, which will depend on the level of population of the 
town. That group consists of: 
 
- Security in public places. 
- Traffic. 
- Citizen protection and fire extinction. 
- City plan and public ways. 
- Historical-artistic patrimony. 
- Environmental protection. 
- Slaughterhouse, markets, and customer protection. 
- Public health. 
- Cemeteries. 
- Social services. 
- Water, electricity, trash collection, and residues. 
- Public transportation. 
- Culture and sports. 
- Some participation in education. 
 
4. Objective of the study and methodology 
 
The decentralization of Spanish public spending from the 
central level of government to the lower ones (regional and local) 
started in 1978 with the proclamation of the Spanish Constitution. 
There is in Spain a important reference that studies the 
decentralization process from the period 1979-1994 (see Braña Pino 
and Serna de los Mozos, 1999), analyzing the problems that this issue 
presents. Given the importance of this process, and trying to solve 
the mentioned problems, the main objective of the present article is 
to show how that decentralization has worked so far, using the new 
regrouping of functions included below. In other words, how has this 
process influenced the functions in which each level of government is 
spending money? The article tries to answer this question in section 
5, but first the author must address some important preliminaries. 
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 First of all, the period of study will be from 1984 to 1997. The 
study starts in 1984 because, although the first Statutes of Autonomy 
were approved in 1979 for two of the seventeen Autonomous 
Communities (País Vasco and Cataluña), 1984 was "the first year in 
which all the Autonomous Communities started to develop their 
complex activity" (Dirección General de Coordinación con las 
Haciendas Territoriales, 1986: p. I) Moreover, the last Statutes of 
Autonomy (to get information about the “Statutes of Autonomy” in 
Spain see García de Enterría, 1985, Bassols Coma, 1983) were 
approved in 1983. Furthermore, "1984 is the first year in which all 
the regional governments had a budget for the entire budgetary 
period" (Dirección General de Coordinación con las Haciendas 
Territoriales, 1999: p. 9) The author finishes with 1997, because it is 
the last year for which the needed statistics are available in all levels 
of government. 
 
 
 
Second, the evolution of public spending in Spain (some 
references are González-Páramo and López Casasnovas, 1996, 
González-Páramo and Utrilla, 1992, Valle, 1988, 1989, 1990, Barea 
Tejeiro, 1988, 1989, González-Páramo and Raymond Bara, 1988, 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
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Graph 1: Public Spending Decentralization: 1984-1997. In 
Percentages Respect to the Consolidated Total Spending.
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Borrell, 1988) has had different periods (the statistical information 
that I have included in this paragraph can be obtained from different 
sources of information: Dirección General de Coordinación con las 
Haciendas Territoriales, 1999, Informe Anual del Banco de España, 
several years, Perspectives Économiques de L'OCDE, 1997, Boletín 
Económico de Información Comercial Española, 1996, Comin, 1988) 
The most important period took place between 1976 and 1985, when 
public spending as a percentage of GIP passed from 27.51% to 
44.10%. That period is called the "welfare state". From 1986 until 
now, growth has continued, but at a slower pace (in 1997 the 
spending was 52.50% of GIP) In this context, one of the most 
important events to note is that spending has been decentralized 
from the Central level of government to the lower ones. Graph 1 (see 
also appendix 1) above shows a general evolution of this 
decentralization process. The paper will present in this section some 
general comments with respect to this graph, after which it will 
present a deeper analysis in section 5. 
 
Graph 1 above shows clearly that the Central level of 
government has lost importance with respect to total public spending 
between 1984 and 1997, and the A.C. and the L.C. have gradually 
increased their share of public spending. The percentages for the 
three government levels (Central, A.C. and L.C.) went respectively 
from 72.6%, 14.4% and 13.0% in 1984, to 53.2%, 30.9% and 15.9% in 
1997.  
 
In section number 1, the author pointed out that developing 
countries and others in transition in eastern and central Europe have 
tried to use decentralization for economic reasons. On the other 
hand, developed countries have searched through decentralization 
for a closer provision of goods and services for their citizens within 
the new «post-welfare state». Recent works (Besley and Oates, 1999, 
Bolton and Roland, 1997) have studied political economy questions 
concerning decentralized systems. The question in this case would 
be: What "moves" decentralization in Spain?  In other words, what 
reason explains or justifies, in relative terms, why public spending 
decreases in central government and increases in regional and local 
governments? 
 
As one of the developed countries, the new «post-welfare 
state» is, without doubt, the answer of this question in Spain. In this 
sense, lower levels of government, with greater sensibility for their 
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citizens’ preferences (Pérez Blanco, 1995: p. 21, Borrell Fontelles, 
1988: p. 181), were demanding wider competencies during Franco's 
dictatorship (1939-1975), but the centralization was practically 
absolute during that period and recoveries of decentralization did 
not find any way of performance until democracy started to work 
(basically the eighties decade) In this sense, nowadays, most of the 
authors explaining the decentralization process in Spain (mainly, and 
among others, Monasterio, 1988, Dizy, 1996, Suárez-Pandiello, 1996, 
1999), argue political motives in trying to justify this process. 
According to (Suárez-Pandiello, 1999: p. 229), "if we are to label the 
origin of our fiscal decentralization process, I think that 'political' is 
the correct adjective". 
 
Performing a general analysis of the different levels of 
government, in 1984, after the transition period from the dictatorship 
to democracy (1975-1983), the Central level started to decrease its 
share of public spending with respect to A.C. and L.C. (remember 
percentages included in graph 1 above) every single year: the 
decentralization recoveries are working. The only exception were 
years 1993 and 1994, when the economic crisis in Spain required the 
implementation of certain centralized decisions. Basically services of 
social security and social assistance were more needed at national 
level.  
 
The great "winners" in the whole decentralization process 
were the Autonomous Communities -see again graph 1-. (Dizy, 1996: 
p. 69) points out that "the origin of the strong increase of regional 
spending is not a bigger demand of public services from citizens, or 
the spending policy adopted by each regional government, but it is 
the consequence of the political process of construction of the State of 
the Autonomies". And here, the author has to remark that this 
process is a political one, because it clearly depends on the political 
party sign handling the Central level of government.  In this sense, 
the political change from PSOE to PP in 1996 was very important: the 
percentages of A.C. spending included in graph 1 were from 27.3% in 
1995 to almost 31% in 1997. This increase was greater than the one of 
the period 1990-1995. Again the author remarks here that always 
"political variables are significant factors in determining the degree 
of decentralization" (Giertz, 1976, page 205) 
 
In some sense, the "losers" of the decentralization process in 
Spain were the Local Corporations. The percentages of L.C. spending 
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included in graph 1 were only from 13% in 1984 to almost 16% in 
1997, moreover the tendency of increase was not as regular as the 
A.C. The main justification of this evolution is that decentralization 
follows different steps and Spain has finished not even the first one, 
since the transference of spending competencies from the Central 
level of government to the A.C. ought to be completed with more 
income competencies. Moreover, a second step is needed: L.C. 
receiving more spending competencies from the A.C.; in a real 
decentralized State, the towns' role must grow (Suárez Pandiello, 
1996) The explanation about the role of L.C. in decentralization 
process will go further in section 5 of this paper.  
 
If, as it has been showed, mainly political motives could justify 
the spending decentralization in Spain, the following question could 
be: what is behind those political motives? In other words, why are 
there no real economic reasons that  justify decentralization? 
Following (Angelet, 1997: p. 140), the answer is that the democratic 
development (at the same time, the main cause of the 
decentralization) did not incorporate so far (at least for our period of 
study: 1984-1997) relevant levels of rationality and economic 
efficiency with respect to decisions about functional and territorial 
allocation of public spending. For instance, important decisions of 
public investment were taken without objective bases or explicit 
criteria, which justify rationally their priority and quantity. 
 
After a description of the preliminaries needed, the author 
has to point out that the main objective of this article is to examine 
how the decentralization process, generally described above, has 
influenced the final destination (or functions) of public spending in 
the different government levels. The methodology chosen for 
reaching this goal is the study of the statistics of public spending 
between 1984 and 1997 in each single level of government, taking into 
account the functional classification of spending. (18) This 
classification shows the destination of the spending. The sources are: 
 
- Classification of the Public Administration Functions  
(C.P.A.F. system), approved from 1984 and also called United 
Nations System. It was assumed also for the European 
Community, but in Spain only the Central Government has 
used this system for a few years. 
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- Another classification arose from the Ministerial 
Order of November 14, 1979 and was applied in 1980: this is 
usually called the old classification. Mainly the Local 
Corporations used it, although some towns are still using it. 
 
- The new functional classification, also called 
programmatic, appeared with the Ministerial Order of 
September 20, 1989. Nowadays, most of the administrations are 
using this classification. 
 
The main problem in comparing statistics is the 
heterogeneous use of the classification of expenditures between the 
different levels of government. The "functional problems", among 
others, were the following (see Molero, 1998: pp. 235-237, 268-274, 
302-312): 
 
- For the Central Government the statistics between 
1984 and 1997 involve a new functional classification. The 
information is also consolidated, (19) and the author was able 
to obtain statistics on real levels of spending, (20) not just the 
budgetary levels. It is the only level where the author did not 
find any statistical problems. 
 
- For the Autonomous Communities there was no 
information regarding real spending according to the new 
functional classification since 1984. Therefore, only the 
statistics of the budgeted spending (21) were available from 
1988 to 1997 according to that classification. At least, it was 
consolidated information. 
 
- With respect to the Local Corporations, there were 
data on real spending between 1984 and 1989 according to the 
old functional classification  (not consolidated information for 
those years), and there was no global functional information 
for 1990 and 1991. (22) Between 1992 and 1997 the statistics 
were consolidated and most of the local administrations were 
using the new functional classification.  
 
In short, it is not possible to follow just one of these 
classifications, since not all government levels use the same one 
between 1984 and 1997. Then, for the purpose of this research, the 
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methodological solution this paper proposes involves a new re-
grouping of spending functions. 
 
The relationship between that re-grouping and the three 
different functional classifications is included in the tables below. 
Numbers in brackets refer to the number of the functional group for 
the new classification, and to the number of the function for the old 
classification and the "C.P.A.F. system". (23) Moreover, the author 
has to point out that sometimes the re-grouping was easier than 
others. For instance, it was more difficult for groups like: "housing 
and relative services" (table 2) or "spending on others services" (table 
3) In both cases there was much heterogeneity among the three 
different functional classifications. 
 
Table1 
 
C.P.A.F. 
SYSTEM 
MINISTERIAL 
ORDER OF 
NOVEMBER 14, 1979 
(Old classification) 
 
MINISTERIAL 
ORDER OF 
SEPTEMBER 20, 1989 
(New classification) 
 
SUGGESTED 
RE-GROUPING 
    
GENERAL 
EXPENDITURES 
 
Defense 
(2) 
  
Defense, civil protection 
National defense 
Public order and 
security. 
(3) 
 
 and citizen security 
(2) 
Public order 
General services of 
the Public 
Administration 
(1) 
 
General services 
(1) 
Services of general sort 
(1) 
General services  
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Table 2 
 
C.P.A.F. 
SYSTEM 
MINISTERIAL 
ORDER OF 
NOVEMBER 14, 1979 
(Old classification) 
 
MINISTERIAL 
ORDER OF 
SEPTEMBER 20, 1989 
(New classification) 
 
SUGGESTED 
RE-GROUPING 
Services of social 
security and social 
assistance 
(6) 
 
Pensions, social security 
and social assistance 
(5) 
Security, protection and 
social promotion 
(3) 
 
SOCIAL 
ASSISTANCE 
  Production of social public 
goods 
(4) 
 
 
SOCIAL 
GOODS 
 
Education services 
(4) 
 
Education 
(3) 
Education Education 
Medical care services 
(5) 
 
Medical care 
(4) 
Medical care Medical care 
Dwelling and city and 
rural planning 
services 
(7) 
 
Entertainment, 
cultural and religious 
services 
(8) 
 
Dwelling and community 
welfare 
(6) 
 
 
Other social and 
community services 
(7) 
 
Dwelling and city 
planning 
 
Community welfare 
 
Culture 
 
Other social and 
community services 
Housing and 
related services 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
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C.P.A.F. 
SYSTEM 
MINISTERIAL 
ORDER OF 
NOVEMBER 14, 1979 
(Old classification) 
 
MINISTERIAL 
ORDER OF 
SEPTEMBER 20, 1989 
(New classification) 
 
SUGGESTED 
RE-GROUPING 
Fuels and energy 
services 
(9) 
 
Services of 
agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and hunting 
(10) 
 
Mining services, 
except fuel for 
manufacture and 
construction 
(11) 
 
Transportation and 
communication 
services 
(12) 
 
Other issues and 
economic services 
(13) 
 
Economic services 
(8) 
Production of economic 
public goods 
(5) 
(Communications, 
transportation, agrarian 
structures, scientific 
research, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
General economic 
regulation 
(6) 
(Economic and financial 
regulation) 
 
 
 
Economic regulation of 
productive sectors 
(7) 
(Agriculture, 
stockbreeding, fishing, 
industry, energy, mining, 
tourism, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
SPENDING ON 
OTHER 
SERVICES 
 
 
 
Non-classified 
spending 
(14) 
 
 
Non-classified 
(9) 
  
NON-
CLASSIFIED 
  Grants to other public 
administrations, national 
or international 
(9) 
 
Grants to other 
public 
administrations 
  Public debt (1) 
(0) 
 
Public debt (1) 
 
 
(1) The expression "public debt" does not mean the total public debt, but makes reference only to the 
amortization of the payable credits plus the interest for each year. 
5. Statistical results 
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This section will show the main results of the research for the 
three levels of government. The author will use the suggested "re-
grouping" of the different expenditures according to tables 1, 2, and 
3. Data will be presented in percentages (24) of total public spending 
at the respective level of government for each year, because this will 
be the clearest way to present comparisons among the different 
government levels. 
 
5.1. Central Government 
 
Through decentralization process, as it was shown in graph 1, 
Central Administration has decreased the quantity of spending from 
1984 to 1997. The objective now is to analyze how its composition has 
changed. The evolution of the performed spending in the Central 
Administration is shown in graph 2 below (and appendix 2) Since the 
percentages for 1997 are distorted, (25) one has to pay attention to 
the period 1984-1996.  
 
Looking at that period, one could say that, in spite of the 
decentralization, the percentage of social assistance with respect to 
total central government spending changed insignificantly between 
1984 and 1996: from 35.97% to 34.59% respectively. The justification 
of this evolution is that pensions (basically retirement and 
unemployment pensions), which are the main component of the social 
assistance, remain centralized at the Central Administration. This 
happens because of political interests which maintain control over 
this spending category, since social assistance spending has also a 
clear distribution component of incomes all over the country, there 
are also economic reasons that determine its centralization. At the 
same time, and partially following (Borrell Fontelles, 1988), one can 
not associate pensions to only one level of government, because there 
is a spending of all administrations, which should be handled by the 
central one.  
 
In the same way, spending on social goods practically maintain 
their percentage importance: they went from 17.73% in 1984 to 
16.48% in 1996. Within this spending category, the decrease of 
education was caused, among other reasons, by the decrease of the 
birthrate which let lower quantity of spending on education. The 
decrease of housing and related services  was determined by 
economic reasons: Central level is not efficient in the allocation of 
this service, because it does not have a good knowledge about the 
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preferences of citizens. Medical care increases since the Central level 
is still handling this service in ten A.C. and because during the 
period of analysis there was remarkable increase of senior citizens. 
 
In contrast, the share of general expenditures (national 
defense, public order and general services) decreased between 1984 
and 1996. They went from 9.36% of total central government 
spending to 5.80%. Expenditure on national defense decreased the 
most. The reason for this is a new international framework at the 
European Union where the protection of Spain is guaranteed (IGAE, 
1998: p. 123) This also makes sense the increase of external relations 
spending -within general services category- (IGAE, 1997: p. 120) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the spending group that really lost importance 
during our period of study was spending on other services. The 
Graph 2: Functional Distribution of Central Government Spending (% 
of the Total Central Administration Spending)
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statistics show that central government level lost most of its control 
over this group of expenditures (mainly production of economic public 
goods and spending on economic regulation of productive sectors) In 
1984 the percentage of total central government spending was 
22.26%, and in 1996 it fell to 10.28%, almost 12 points. According to 
IGAE (1987: p. 206; and 1991: p. 140), the determinants -mainly 
economics- of this decrease are many and difficult to list. Among 
others, the better results and financial situation of the 
entrepreneurial sector and the assumption of competencies from A.C. 
Moreover, fewer resources have been assigned to the sub-function 
agriculture, stockbreeding and fishing. 
 
Finally, decentralization took place within the Central 
Government, and this tendency continues today, an increase in the 
non-classified group of expenditures, that went from 14.69% over the 
total central government spending in 1984 to almost 33% in 1996. 
Basically, both of its components increased in this period. The grants 
to other public administrations subgroup had a continuing increase, 
caused by the special financing system working at the regional and 
local levels of government (IGAE, 1987: p. 161; and 1991: p. 140) 
These grants were even bigger that the grants to the European 
Community, see (IGAE, several years) The increase of the public debt 
was another great effect of the decentralization; the percentages 
went from 7.84% of total central government spending in 1984 to 
almost 20% in 1996. This happened because until 1997 Central level 
had less control over deficits, (26) which were mainly financed by 
debt. The situation changed since June 1997, where European 
Union's Council approved the Stability and Growth Pact (27) (see 
Ruiz Álvarez, 1999: p. 5) In this sense, Central government decided to 
pay off in advance a bigger quantity of public debt that year, and here 
is the distortion of the statistics mentioned above. 
 
5.2. Autonomous Communities (A.C.) 
 
It was showed in graph 1 how, by virtue of the 
decentralization process, the A.C. have acquired an increased 
spending capacity. Their expenditures went from 14.4% with respect 
to the consolidated spending of the Public Administrations in 1984, to 
30.9% in 1997, with the political determinants being very important 
in this process. However, looking at graph 3 (and appendix 3), the 
first impression is that the composition of this spending did not 
change much during those years. This is only partially true, because 
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one needs to distinguish what happened in the two different kinds of 
A.C., that is, the A.C. with "high level of competencies" and those 
with "low level of competencies" (see appendix 4) The author will try 
to analyze what has determined the spending behavior in these two 
different kinds of regions. 
 
 
 
Expenditure on social goods (see graph 3) in the A.C. was 
56.30% of the total A.C. expenditure in 1988, and 52.34% in 1997. In 
the same way, spending on social assistance decreased less than two 
points between these years. The key point behind these data is that 
A.C. with "high level of competencies" absorbed most of the spending 
on social goods and social assistance (see graph 4), because of their 
higher level of competencies (basically on medical care and 
education) Expenditures on these groups started growing between 
1984 and 1988 (28) (when they received most of their competencies, 
although statistics are not available for this period) and the tendency 
continues from 1988 to 1997 in most of them. The contrary happened 
in the regions with "low level of competencies", where spending 
percentages on social assistance and social goods (see graph 4) were 
clearly lower, and decreased in most of these A.C. between 1988 and 
1997. The influence of this group of regions caused the decrease of 
Graph 3: Functional Distribution of Autonomous Communities 
Spending (% of the Total A. C. Spending) 
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global percentages on social assistance and social goods referred to 
the beginning of this paragraph. 
 
 The statistics for the period 1998-2001 will reflect the 
influence of the A.C. with "low level of competencies", which are 
receive during these years more competencies for social goods, 
basically non-university education. (29) 
 
 
 
This is the situation, but what is the cause? According to 
(Brosio, 1997: p. 214), "the reasons behind the creation of the hybrid 
Spanish system -often referred to as a "multispeed regional system"- 
are to be found..., in the linguistic differences..., and in the separatist 
tendencies of some regions". In this sense, greater historical 
background has allowed some regions to claim control over specific 
social goods, primarily in education and medical care (Dizy, 1996) The 
simulation study made for the year 1993 by (Monasterio Escudero 
and Suárez Pandiello, 1998: p. 59), show that over all the 
competencies one region can assume, the quantitative weight of 
education and medical care, as spending categories, could represent 
even more than 80% over the total competencies. This explains two 
things. First, the great interest that some regions (the ones with 
more historical background) have to assume these competencies . 
Graph 4: Evolution of Autonomous Communities Social Assistance + 
Social Goods Spending (% of the Total Spending in each A. C.)
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Second, the big percentages that social assistance and social goods, as 
categories of spending, represent over their total spending in these 
regions: for instance, 75% in the Autonomous Community of Valencia 
(see graph 4) 
 
Something similar, but in the opposite direction, happened 
with the expenditure group called in this article spending on other 
services -mainly production of economic public goods and 
expenditures on economic regulation of productive sectors- (see graph 
5) In this case, most of the A.C. with "low level of competencies" 
increased their percentages on this spending group between 1988 
and 1997. On the other hand, only three of the A.C. with "high level of 
competencies" followed this pattern; moreover, all of them had, for 
that same period, smaller percentages of these expenditures with 
respect to those with "low level of competencies". Taking into 
account this explanation, it is easier to understand that the global 
spending on others services percentages in all A.C. increased: from 
18.30% respect to the total A.C. spending in 1988 to 20.90% in 1997 
(see graph 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5: Evolution of Autonomous Communities Spending 
on Other Services  (% of the Total Spending in each A. C.)
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The question here would be: Why is this spending category 
smaller in A.C. with "low level of competencies"? Two reasons could 
explain this trend. First, they are A.C. with less historical 
background, receiving first competencies in economic public goods 
and economic regulation of productive sectors from Central 
government (see Molero, 1998: pp. 295-296) and then in social goods 
(as it is starting to happen nowadays) Second, most of these regions 
have been (and they continue to be), for the period of analysis of this 
paper, within the group of the less developed regions of Spain, 
receiving grants from the European Union. (30) These were precisely 
grants to improve basic infrastructures (transportation, energy, etc.), 
scientific research, agriculture, etc. In other words: grants on 
economic public goods and economic regulation of productive sectors. 
According to (Utrilla, 1996: p. 269), the regional incidence of EU 
grants is very different among A.C.: bigger than 30% of the budgetary 
incomes in regions like Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y León and 
Extremadura, and only 2% in Cataluña, Madrid, Navarra and País 
Vasco. In general, there is a great relationship between A.C. 
competencies, the quantity of EU grants and the degree of regional 
development. 
 
 
Graph 6: Evolution of Autonomous Communities General 
Expenditures (% of the Total Spending in each A. C.)
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As it was analyzed in section 5.1, general expenditures did not 
increase for the Central Government during the period 1984-1997, 
and neither did they increase for the Autonomous Communities (see 
graph 3); rather they did not change too much, going from 4.47% over 
the total A.C. spending in 1988 to 3.65% in 1997. Graph 6 above show 
that, due to decentralization process, these expenditures lost 
importance in most of the A.C.: both with high or low level of 
competencies. During our period of analysis the region of País Vasco 
shows bigger percentages on general expenditures, see (Dirección 
General de Coordinación con las Haciendas Territoriales, 1998: p. 
303) for more information. The justification here is that this 
Autonomous Community has a special problem to solve (the 
terrorism), which is causing bigger spending on public order, and 
three provinces with a special Foral regime of financing, which need 
more coordination from the regional level, causing bigger spending 
on general services. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 7: Evolution of Autonomous Communities Non-Classified 
Spending (Grants + Public Debt)  
(% of the Total Spending in each A. C.)
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Looking again at graph 3 above, the non-classified group of 
expenditures had a clear growth for the A.C.: from 12.65% of the total 
spending in 1998 to 16.43% in 1997. However, the components of this 
group showed different evolutions. The grants to other public 
administrations subgroups had an irregular tendency to fluctuate 
among the different years of the period. In contrast, the public debt 
subgroup went from 1.97% in 1988 to almost 7% in 1997, with a 
regular growth during the whole period. The debt levels were higher 
in the A.C. with "low level of competencies" than in the ones with 
"high level" -see graph 7 above- (see for that information Dirección 
General de Acción Económica Territorial, 1996: p. 285, Dirección 
General de Coordinación con las Haciendas Territoriales, 1999: pp. 
77-333) 
 
The justification of the general growth of the debt in all the 
A.C. can be explained by the fact that most of the communities 
suddenly found that they had to increase their spending (thanks to 
the decentralization process), with a lack of experience in that 
matter and, in many cases, without the right means to finance it. This 
problem is greater in the regions (15 over the total of 17) with a 
Common regime of financing, (31) because there is a lack of "fiscal co-
responsibility" among incomes and spending: the financing system is 
mainly based on grants coming from the Central government, instead 
of on the taxing power of the regions. The study of A.C. financing 
system is a really interesting topic, but one can not go further in this 
paper. Two authors who make great contributions are (Rubio and 
Sanz, 2000, Monasterio Escudero, 1997) Other important works about 
the financing means for the A.C. are, for instance (Monasterio 
Escudero and Zubiri, 1996, Martínez García-Moncó, 1996, Ezquiaga, 
1996, Utrilla de La Hoz, 1995, several authors, 1995, Ruíz-Huerta 
Carbonell and López Laborda, 1995, Carpio, 1994, Monasterio 
Escudero, 1988) 
 
As a summary, through the decentralization process, A.C. in 
Spain are spending basically more on social assistance, social goods, 
economic public goods and economic regulation of productive sectors. In 
all these spending categories, citizens can better observe the 
behavior of the government and how it provides goods and services. 
Likewise, the regional government can know better the citizens’ 
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preferences. In this instance, one can think that decentralization 
makes sense, and, generally speaking in the context of traditional 
fiscal federalism theory, it can bring us closer to the theory of optimal 
jurisdictional size and to the principle of "fiscal equivalence". (32) But, 
the problem is that, from an economic point of view, it is hard to 
explain why they are so many differences among regions. According 
to (Rosselló Villalonga, 2001: p. 20), "it seems that the level of 
population, the size of the territory or even historical arguments, 
cannot explain how regions were created. Although most of the 
theories related to the creation of new jurisdictional units assume 
that regions are created on an economic basis, the present territorial 
division in Spain is largely culturally and political determined", what 
is conditioning, at the same time, A.C.'s financing system, which is 
not based on the volume of assumed responsibilities, bringing us 
further off the principle of "fiscal equivalence. Moreover, "the lack of 
an explicit agreement about the ceiling of responsibilities to be 
reached by A.C....has produced a series of juridical conflicts and 
inefficient duplicities of bureaucratic organisms" (Suárez-Pandiello, 
1999: p. 232) 
 
Because decentralization is caused largely by political 
reasons, it is therefore difficult to justify it through the fiscal 
federalism theory, which is based mainly on economic arguments. (for 
a wider information in this sense, see Suárez-Pandiello, 1999: pp. 
229-232, 250-251) From the spending point of view, regions are 
carrying out significant redistribution and stabilization activity. In 
this case, the economics arguments for the centralization of 
redistribution and stabilization functions does not work. In general, 
economic federalism (33) seems too be biased in favor of 
centralization, while cooperative federalism (the case of Spain) seems 
to favor the fiscal constitution too in the other direction (Inman and 
Rubinfeld, 1997: p. 50) On the other hand, and from the point of view 
of income (although going further from the objective of this article), 
"fiscal decentralization in Spain...respects to a high degree fiscal 
federalism theory guidelines..., because taxes more closely related to 
redistributive or stabilising activities (income tax or corporation tax 
for example) were not decentralised with the exception of Foral 
regimes" (Suárez-Pandiello, 1999: p. 250) 
 
5.3. Local Corporations (L.C.) 
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As it has been already showed (remember graph 1), Local 
Corporations have not received many advantages from the 
decentralization process this paper is analyzing. Their spending only 
increased from 13% of total spending of Public Administrations in 
1984 to almost 16% in 1997. Therefore, the interest of this section is 
to study if at least the spending composition has changed. 
 
Looking at graph 8 below, one observes that spending 
percentages on social assistance did not change too much for L.C. 
during the period of 1984-1997. One can also see that expenditures on 
social goods (education, medical care and housing and related 
services) accounted for every single year of that period, the largest 
fraction of total spending of L.C. However, these expenditures 
decreased from 44.16% in 1984 to 33.58% in 1997.  
 
The determinant of the evolution of social goods spending is 
that the local level of government was not the one that received 
competencies like education or medical care through the first step of 
the decentralization process; rather it was the regional level that 
received them. For this reason, L.C. lost "power" in these spending 
groups between 1984 and 1997. In this sense, one could argue again 
political reasons driving this evolution.  
 
 
Graph 8: Functional Distribution of Local Corporations Spending (% 
of the Total L. C. Spending) 
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But, Local Corporations increased its percentages of spending 
on housing and related services with respect to the total spending on 
social goods: they went from 73% in 1984 to 84% in 1997 (see 
appendix 5), even though this expenditure decreased with respect to 
total spending of L.C. This implies that, in some sense, the internal 
change within the category of social goods  spending has also been 
driven by economic determinants, because L.C. are more efficient and 
possess a greater knowledge of citizens' preferences for the provision 
of housing and related services spending (Ahmad et all., 1995) 
 
The general expenditures group decreased at the central level, 
but neither of the lower governments offset this reduction (see again 
graph 8) As it happened at the regional level, in the L.C. the 
percentages of this spending group also decreased. As can be seen, 
they went from 20.48% with respect to total spending in this 
government level in 1984, to 16.13% in 1997. In this case, The author 
believes that the Local Corporations, through the decentralization 
process, should have increased spending in this group: that is, 
expenditure on goods and services where L.C. have most of their 
competencies, as it has been seen in section three. Examples of these 
competencies are: security in public places, traffic, citizen protection 
and fire extinction, city plan and public ways, cemeteries, water, 
public lighting, trash collection, public transportation, etc. As for the 
case of housing and related services, there was sufficient economic 
determinants for hoping the increase of general expenditures 
category. 
 
With respect to spending on other services group, which 
decreased in the Central government, one sees that it clearly 
increased in the L.C., where the percentages went from 6.15% in 1984 
to 13.29% in 1997. In this case, the local level received the "power" 
over this spending group through decentralization.  
 
There are different reasons that could explain this evolution 
(FEMP, 1999) On one hand, political determinants, because some 
times A.C. entrust to Local Governments the provision of a set of 
expenditures that they are not really included within the legal 
competencies for L.C. (34) This is the case, for instance, of spending 
on: agrarian structures, scientific research, economic and financial 
regulation, stock breeding, fishing, industry, energy, mining, tourism, 
etc.; all of them included on spending on other services group. On the 
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other hand, there are some economic reasons, because citizens are 
nowadays demanding to the L.C. newer kinds of services belonging to 
this spending category. 
 
Finally, the percentages on non-classified expenditures 
(grants to other public administrations and public debt) increased in 
the period of study; they went from 21.67% of total L.C. spending in 
1984, to 28.34% in 1997.  
 
The importance of the subgroup grants to other public 
administrations was basically due to one of the local governments 
called "Foral deputations" (35) of the Autonomous Community País 
Vasco, that have special competencies in this Community. In fact, the 
financing of País Vasco is performed through grants coming from 
"Foral Deputations".  
 
In this government level, the public debt reached important 
percentages during all the years of the period, but without high 
differences between 1984 and 1997. The justification of this 
persistent debt is that L.C. do not have the right means for financing 
their competencies, by not having sufficient grants coming from 
Central Government and A.C. Literature presents some papers (see 
Pérez García, 1995, Suárez-Pandiello, 1997, 2000, Ezquiaga, 2000) 
explaining the incomes' aspect for local government. In this sense, 
(Ezquiaga, 2000: p. 232) consider rachitic the tributary incomes L.C. 
are handling. (Pérez García, 1995: p. 16) says that L.C. need a firm 
horizon of stability in both aspects: competencies and financing 
incomes. 
 
As a summary, through decentralization process, L.C. in Spain 
are spending basically on housing and related services (relating to the 
total of social goods) and economic regulation of productive sectors. 
Although the author has pointed out above some economic reasons, 
again mainly political determinants have driven that process. 
Because of that, the study about how the decentralization process to 
L.C. in Spain has followed the general guidelines of the fiscal 
federalism theory is as unclear as the one that the author did for 
regions. Moreover, here one more difficulty appears: L.C. are still 
waiting for a second step of decentralization process, receiving 
competencies from A.C., where the period 1984-1997 have been not a 
significant one.  
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In this sense, the author thinks some tendencies seems to 
bring us closer to those general guidelines. First, as in A.C., the taxes 
which are more closely related to redistribution or stabilization 
activities were not decentralized to L.C. Second, the increase of 
housing and related services spending category shows a greater 
search of the coincidence between the geographic area of public good 
benefits and the jurisdictional area where the government provides 
that public good (the principle of "fiscal equivalence") and also a 
maximization of benefits and a minimization of cost in its provision 
(the theory of optimal jurisdictional size)  
 
But, other tendencies seems to bring us further off the general 
guidelines of the fiscal federalism theory. First, L.C. are carrying out 
redistribution and stabilization activity. Second, L.C.'s financing 
system, is not based on the volume of assumed responsibilities 
(against the principle of "fiscal equivalence") 
 
6. Concluding observations 
 
The most challenging task in this research was to find the 
statistics and, after that, to classify them in the most useful way in 
order to study how public spending decentralization takes place in 
Spain. In spite of the complexity of this enterprise, the paper 
provides a general picture of the evolution of spending among the 
different levels of government. 
 
The main point is that the real "winners" of the 
decentralization process has been the A.C., which have increased 
their redistribution and stabilization activity during the period of 
analysis, but with many differences among the A.C. with "high level 
of competencies" and the ones with "low level of competencies". 
Moreover, the main problem here is that the process should have had 
a clearer arrival point and a parallel process of income 
decentralization from Central government. 
 
In the case of L.C., they have reached greater percentages on 
stabilization spending, but here the process has just begun and 
nothing is really done. Again here, a greater means to finance the 
competencies transferred is needed in the local government. 
 
The study about how that decentralization process in Spain 
has followed the general guidelines of the fiscal federalism theory, 
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mainly based on economic arguments, is not a clear issue. It will 
depend of the kind of aspects from what the process is seen.  
 
Literature presents many authors who summarizes the 
problematic issue this paper handles. For instance, according to 
(Suárez-Pandiello, 1999: p. 251), "the Spanish process of 
decentralisation continues to be an incomplete and fundamentally 
unstable system, due...to the fact that its origin was political rather 
than economic". In this sense, (Rosselló Villalonga, 2001: p. 23) points 
out that the "inefficiencies are due to the non-cooperative behaviors 
of regional governments and to the competition that arises between 
all levels of government". 
 
In spite of the different kind of problems listed above, the 
author has to remark that the public spending decentralization has 
been one the greatest events in Spain during recent years. Moreover, 
it has helped Spain to establish a democratic spirit and move through 
the centralization phase. 
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APPENDIX 1: Consolidated spending of the Public Administrations. Decentralized 
structure. Statistics in millions of pesetas and in percentages respect to the 
consolidated total. 
 CENTRAL 
LEVEL  
(1) and (2) 
 A. C.  
(2) and (3) 
 L. C. 
(2) and (4) 
 PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATIONS 
 
 Total  %       Total  % Total  % TOTAL  % 
 
1984 6,178,150 72.6% 1,227,650 14.4% 1,106,640 13.0% 8,512,450 100% 
1985 6,931,130 70.7% 1,545,960 15.8% 1,321,600 13.5% 9,798,700 100% 
1986 7,311,833 68.7% 1,833,479 17.2% 1,500,853 14.1% 10,646,165 100% 
1987 7,711,673 66.6% 2,167,328 18.7% 1,692,919 14.6% 11,571,920 100% 
1988 7,635,427 61.5% 2,816,318 22.7% 1,963,472 15.8% 12,415,217 100% 
1989 9,150,571 60.7% 3,488,127 23.1% 2,437,762 16.2% 15,076,460 100% 
1990 10,508,887 59.6% 4,210,321 23.9% 2,915,305 16.5% 17,634,513 100% 
1991 11,169,503 58.3% 4,869,870 25.4% 3,104,698 16.2% 19,144,071 100% 
1992 12,207,146 57.0% 5,704,963 26.6% 3,519,570 16.4% 21,431,679 100% 
1993 13,573,856 58.1% 6,179,590 26.4% 3,618,649 15.5% 23,372,095 100% 
1994 15,016,092 58.8% 6,806,344 26.7% 3,711,579 14.5% 25,534,015 100% 
1995 15,367,393 58.0% 7,234,838 27.3% 3,872,514 14.6% 26,474,745 100% 
1996 15,140,370 55.6% 7,930,660 29.1% 4,160,668 15.3% 27,231,698 100% 
1997 14,771,943 53.2% 8,588,785 30.9% 4,427,368 15.9% 27,788,096 100% 
(1) Unemployment and Social Security pensions are not included. 
(2) The spending in financial liabilities variation is not included. 
(3) A.C.= Autonomous Communities. 
(4) L.C.= Local Corporations. 
Bibliography: Self elaboration from: Dirección General de Coordinación con las Haciendas 
Territoriales. La descentralización del gasto público en España. Periods: 1984-1994, 1985-1996 
and 1986-1997. 
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APPENDIX 2: Evolution of the functional distribution of the performed spending in 
the Central Administration. Period 1984-1997. In percentages respect to the total 
Central Administration spending. 
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
General 
Expenditures 
9.36% 9.80% 8.60% 8.96% 8.49% 7.34% 7.19% 
National 
Defense 
5.62% 5.57% 4.92% 5.25% 4.61% 3.94% 3.58% 
Public Order 2.27% 2.69% 2.36% 2.31% 2.40% 2.08% 2.15% 
General 
Services 
1.47% 1.54% 1.31% 1.40% 1.48% 1.32% 1.45% 
Social 
Assistance 
35.97% 36.74% 34.97% 34.78% 34.34% 31.89% 34.43% 
Social Goods 17.73% 17.85% 16.37% 16.81% 18.64% 16.73% 16.83% 
Education 5.05% 4.74% 4.27% 4.17% 4.82% 4.17% 4.49% 
Medical Care 11.17% 11.50% 10.73% 11.39% 12.74% 11.50% 11.36% 
Housing and 
related Services 
1.51% 1.62% 1.37% 1.26% 1.09% 1.06% 0.98% 
Spending on 
other Services 
22.26% 16.59% 14.28% 13.82% 15.51% 14.11% 13.20% 
Non-Classified 14.69% 19.02% 25.79% 25.62% 23.02% 29.93% 28.36% 
Grants to other 
Public 
Administration
s 
6.85% 7.35% 9.47% 11.41% 11.63% 10.99% 12.03% 
Public Debt 7.84% 11.66% 16.32% 14.21% 11.38% 18.94% 16.33% 
TOTAL 
SPENDING 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
General 
Expenditures 
7.80% 5.76% 6.15% 5.72% 6.19% 5.80% 4.52% 
National 
Defense 
4.36% 2.54% 2.86% 2.57% 2.79% 2.54% 2.07% 
Public Order 2.08% 1.95% 1.91% 1.81% 1.89% 1.88% 1.43% 
General 
Services 
1.36% 1.27% 1.37% 1.35% 1.51% 1.38% 1.01% 
Social 
Assistance 
34.56% 34.61% 36.15% 36.19% 36.58% 34.59% 28.02% 
Social Goods 16.68% 16.53% 16.67% 16.91% 17.53% 16.48% 12.97% 
Education 4.43% 3.72% 3.78% 3.70% 3.97% 3.21% 2.49% 
Medical Care 11.41% 12.17% 11.93% 12.32% 12.62% 12.31% 9.84% 
Housing and 
related Services 
0.85% 0.64% 0.96% 0.89% 0.95% 0.95% 0.64% 
Spending on 
other Services 
11.88% 10.03% 10.98% 10.79% 10.55% 10.28% 7.53% 
Non-Classified 29.08% 33.07% 30.06% 30.39% 29.16% 32.85% 46.96% 
Grants to other 
Public 
Administration
s 
11.73% 12.88% 13.21% 13.54% 12.81% 13.39% 11.83% 
Public Debt 17.35% 20.19% 16.85% 16.85% 16.35% 19.46% 35.13% 
TOTAL 
SPENDING 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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Bibliography: Self elaboration from: Intervención General de la Administración del Estado. 
Actuación Económica y Financiera de las Administraciones Públicas, several years. 
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APPENDIX 3: Evolution of the functional distribution of the budgeted spending in 
the Autonomous Communities. Period 1988-1997. In percentages respect to the total 
A.C. spending. 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
General 
Expenditures 
4.47% 4.44% 4.23% 4.41% 4.83% 3.66% 
Public Order (1) 0.89% 0.96% 0.99% 1.05% 1.10% 1.04% 
General Services 3.58% 3.48% 3.24% 3.36% 3.73% 2.61% 
Social 
Assistance 
8.28% 8.68% 8.72% 8.27% 7.65% 6.99% 
Social Goods (2) 56.30% 55.17% 55.51% 54.84% 56.03% 54.50% 
Education _ _ _ _ _ 18.89% 
Medical Care _ _ _ _ _ 28.43% 
Housing and 
related Services  
_ _ _ _ _ 7.17% 
Spending on 
other Services 
18.30% 19.13% 19.18% 20.09% 18.78% 16.27% 
Non-Classified 12.65% 12.59% 12.36% 12.39% 12.71% 18.60% 
Grants to other 
Public 
Administrations 
10.68% 10.18% 9.20% 8.78% 8.30% 12.41% 
Public Debt 1.97% 2.40% 3.16% 3.62% 4.41% 6.18% 
TOTAL 
SPENDING 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 1994 1995 1996 1997   
General 
Expenditures 
3.25% 3.66% 3.63% 3.65%   
Public Order (1) 1.01% 1.14% 1.15% 1.10%   
General Services 2.24% 2.52% 2.47% 2.55%   
Social 
Assistance 
7.01% 6.65% 6.91% 6.68%   
Social Goods 51.49% 53.87% 54.50% 52.34%   
Education 17.70% 18.92% 19.96% 19.53%   
Medical Care 27.32% 27.33% 27.00% 25.96%   
Housing and 
related Services  
6.47% 7.62% 7.54% 6.85%   
Spending on 
other Services 
19.04% 19.60% 18.20% 20.90%   
Non-Classified 19.20% 16.23% 16.77% 16.43%   
Grants to other 
Public 
Administrations 
12.20% 9.31% 9.42% 9.54%   
Public Debt 7.00% 6.92% 7.35% 6.90%   
TOTAL 
SPENDING 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   
(1) It does not make much sense to speak about "National Defense" for the A.C.; therefore, the data 
makes reference just to "Public order". 
(2) There are not consolidated statistics for all the Autonomous Communities about "education", 
"medical care", and "housing and related services" until 1993. 
Bibliography: Self elaboration from: Dirección General de Coordinación con las Haciendas 
Territoriales. Presupuestos de las Comunidades Autónomas, several years. 
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APPENDIX 4: Functional budgets of the Autonomous Communities. Years 1988 and 
1997. Data in percentages respect to the total budget in each Autonomous 
Community for each year. 
 
AUTONOMOUS 
COMMUNITY 
 
General 
Expenditures 
 
 
Social 
Assistance 
+ 
Social Goods 
 
 
Spending on 
other Services 
 
 
Non-Classified 
(Grants + 
Public Debt) 
 
HIGH LEVEL OF 
COMPETENCIES 
1988 1997 1988 1997 1988 1997 1988 1997 
ANDALUCIA 2.92% 0.79% 71.00% 61.75% 13.54% 19.80% 12.51% 17.67% 
CANARIAS 4.25% 1.34% 67.47% 74.67% 24.05% 11.88% 4.17% 12.11% 
CATALUÑA 4.58% 6.34% 66.83% 62.22% 10.47% 9.61% 18.06% 21.83% 
GALICIA 1.88% 1.75% 55.61% 66.70% 23.29% 14.89% 19.24% 16.16% 
NAVARRA 8.19% 5.47% 48.36% 57.84% 27.03% 15.51% 16.33% 21.18% 
PAIS VASCO 12.05% 13.77% 73.68% 66.37% 10.11% 10.75% 4.11% 9.11% 
VALENCIA 1.11% 2.78% 74.67% 74.80% 8.85% 14.31% 15.32% 8.11% 
LOW LEVEL OF 
COMPETENCIES 
        
ARAGÓN 4.50% 3.17% 41.21% 24.45% 52.80% 54.28% 1.43% 18.12% 
ASTURIAS 9.62% 3.41% 43.04% 41.80% 42.82% 40.26% 4.40% 14.54% 
BALEARES 8.46% 7.87% 41.16% 44.83% 45.81% 32.24% 4.34% 15.26% 
CANTABRIA 10.69% 5.12% 24.50% 40.22% 40.27% 43.75% 24.35% 10.90% 
CASTILLA-LA 
MANCHA 
3.60% 1.18% 34.28% 19.45% 33.55% 54.23% 28.56% 25.14% 
CASTILLA-LEÓN 2.73% 1.51% 43.82% 35.67% 52.94% 54.55% 5.50% 8.26% 
EXTREMADURA 4.19% 1.27% 56.31% 33.90% 38.88% 49.32% 0.52% 15.17% 
LA RIOJA 11.12% 4.76% 50.39% 47.91% 34.63% 27.77% 3.68% 19.56% 
MADRID 4.04% 3.19% 61.11% 59.17% 32.72% 18.64% 2.08% 19.00% 
MURCIA 7.05% 3.23% 54.19% 35.37% 30.79% 39.01% 7.84% 22.39% 
         
Bibliography: Self elaboration from: Dirección General de Coordinación con las Haciendas 
Territoriales. Presupuestos de las Comunidades Autónomas, years 1988 and 1997. Las Haciendas 
Territoriales en cifras. Ejercicios 1997 y 1998. 
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APPENDIX 5: Evolution of the functional distribution of the performed spending in 
the Local Corporations. Period 1984-1997. In percentages respect to the total L.C. 
spending. 
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
General 
Expenditures 
20.48% 21.68% 20.14% 18.74% 17.03% 16.35% 
Public Order (1) _ _ _ _ _ _ 
General Services 20.48% 21.68% 20.14% 18.74% 17.03% 16.35% 
Social Assistance 7.55% 7.41% 7.32% 6.75% 5.48% 4.97% 
Social Goods 44.16% 39.88% 46.10% 41.30% 34.65% 36.99% 
Education 4.88% 4.15% 4.45% 3.79% 2.99% 3.60% 
Medical Care 7.02% 6.20% 6.21% 4.99% 3.54% 3.06% 
Housing and 
related Services 
32.25% 29.54% 35.44% 32.52% 28.12% 30.33% 
Spending on 
other Services 
6.15% 5.41% 6.03% 4.94% 4.29% 4.57% 
Non-Classified (2) 21.67% 25.61% 20.41% 28.28% 38.55% 37.11% 
Grants to other 
Public 
Administrations 
4.52% 7.31% 1.98% 8.95% 17.92% 16.34% 
Public Debt 13.23% 15.11% 15.08% 17.73% 18.71% 18.43% 
Remainder 3.92% 3.19% 3.35% 1.60% 1.93% 2.35% 
TOTAL 
SPENDING 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
General 
Expenditures 
16.02% 16.76% 16.21% 17.05% 17.52% 16.13% 
Public Order (1) 4.78% 4.96% 4.96% 5.45% 5.47% 5.35% 
General Services 11.23% 11.80% 11.26% 11.60% 12.06% 10.77% 
Social Assistance 7.94% 7.96% 7.71% 8.48% 8.80% 8.66% 
Social Goods 32.96% 32.82% 32.75% 34.14% 33.09% 33.58% 
Education 3.51% 3.36% 3.52% 3.57% 3.23% 3.23% 
Medical Care 3.09% 2.72% 2.45% 2.32% 1.85% 2.14% 
Housing and 
related Services 
26.36% 26.73% 26.78% 28.25% 28.01% 28.22% 
Spending on 
other Services 
13.86% 14.47% 13.93% 14.40% 13.38% 13.29% 
Non-Classified 29.22% 27.98% 29.40% 25.93% 27.21% 28.34% 
Grants to other 
Public 
Administrations 
13.72% 13.31% 12.89% 13.18% 13.91% 15.48% 
Public Debt 15.51% 14.67% 16.51% 12.75% 13.29% 12.86% 
TOTAL 
SPENDING 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
(1) It does not make much sense to speak about "National Defense" for the L.C. On the other hand, 
there are available statistics for "public order" only since 1992; until that year, information about "public 
order" is within "general services". (2) There are not available statistics for "grants to other Public 
Administrations" and "public debt" until 1992. I synthesized the information from both: the functional 
classification of the spending and the economic classification of the spending from 1984 to 1989; 
for that reason, a new group called "remainder" emerged for this period. 
Bibliography: Self elaboration from: Direccion General de Coordinacion con las Haciendas 
Territoriales. Liquidación de Presupuestos de las Corporaciones Locales, period 1984-1997.  
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Notes 
 
1. There are useful works explaining the tandem centralization-
decentralization in (Vallés Giménez and Zárate Marco, 2000: 
pp. 118-131) and (Begg et al., 1993: pp. 40-47) Moreover, and 
among others, one could mention here some additional 
researches on this topic. (Fearon , 2000) analyzes the impact of 
budget size on a government's choice to centralize or 
decentralize the budgetary process. (Costrell, 1997) analyzes 
the relationship among decentralization, centralization, and 
welfare. (Domínguez, 1974) gives a really good historical 
overview about decentralization versus centralization. Of 
course, also (Oates, 1993 and 1997) presents interesting 
studies on this matter. 
 
2. In this sense, (Panniza, 1998: pp. 263-264) points out that with 
the end of the Cold War, "strong pressures for a more 
decentralized system have been at the center of the political 
scene in many Western European countries". Another 
interesting work about decentralization in Europe is: (Begg et 
al., 1993) 
 
3. It is not the objective of this research to perform a wide study 
on fiscal federalism. A good description of this issue is, for 
instance, in (Albi et al., 2000: pp. 159-219, and Musgrave and 
Musgrave, 1992: pp. 557-620) 
 
4. (King, 1984) revised and updated this theory and a recently 
review is in (Oates, 1999) 
 
5. Moreover last Oates' article on fiscal federalism, worthy 
summaries describing these functions among the different 
government levels are in (Vallés Giménez and Zárate Marco, 
2000: pp. 118-131, Molero, 1998: pp. 19-39, Jaén García and 
Molina Morales, 1996, and Musgrave and Musgrave, 1992: pp. 
557-620) 
 
6. According to (Oates, 1999: pp. 1122), two useful treatments of 
the assignment of specific public services to the appropriate 
level of government are (McKinnon and Nechyba, 1997, and 
Shah, 1994) 
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7. The "theory of the optimal jurisdictional size" has its roots in 
the Buchanan's "economic theory of clubs". For more 
information see (Buchanan, 1965) 
 
8. In Spain there are three basic levels of government: central (or 
state), regional (or autonomous) and local. In the U.S.A., for 
instance, these government levels are respectively: federal, 
state and local. 
 
9. This kind of federalism is explained in title number 2 of this 
paper, referring to the principle of cooperative federalism, or 
decentralized federalism (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997 and 1998) 
 
10. Two important laws in the regulation of Spanish A.C. are: the 
law 8/1980, September 22, for the regulation of the financing of 
A.C. And the law 9/1992, December 23, with which the 
competencies equalization process between the different A.C. 
started. 
 
11. Non university studies have been transferred in recent years, 
after 1997. Therefore, they are not included in the statistics of 
this research. 
 
12. Important laws in the regulation of Spanish L.C. are: the 
"Local Regime Regulations" (LRR), April 2, 1985. And the 
"Local Governmental Regulations" (LGR), December 28, 1988. 
 
13. In Spain the provinces role is today more difficult to 
determine, because, basically from the beginning of the 
decentralization of the Spanish public administration, they are 
situated between two strengthened entities: the Autonomous 
Communities and the towns. In the U.S.A. the equivalent 
entity for the provinces could be the counties. 
 
14. The autonomous cities are included within the L.C. statistics 
only until 1996, because they acquired a special status through 
laws 1 and 2/1995, May 13. See for more information: Boletín 
Oficial Del Estado, May 14, 1995. 
 
15. Since 1997 budgets of Ceuta and Melilla are included within 
statistics of the A.C. See (Dirección General De Coordinación 
Con Las Haciendas Territoriales, 1998) 
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16. A brief summary about the competencies for the rest of 
entities that compose the L.C. is offered in (Molero, 1998: pp. 
130-131) See also the "Regulating Local Regime Law" (RLRL), 
April 2, 1985. 
 
17. Basically, the problem is that they are general statements 
rather than specific rules.  
 
 
18. In Spain there are many ways to classify the public spending, 
but the four most important are: The organic classification 
responds to the question: who spends? Through the economic 
classification one can answer the question: what is the 
spending on?  The territorial classification is not exactly a 
specific classification; rather that it is a detailed way to 
present the spending budget. The functional classification is 
the most recent method to classify the public spending and 
through it one can respond to the question: what is the 
spending for? This classification, according to the opinion from 
several authors, see (Dizy Menéndez, 1996, Barea Tejeiro, 
1971, 1989), is the best way to classify the public spending, 
because it is the only one that shows the real and final 
destination (or objective) of the different spending concepts. 
For a wider explanation about the different ways to classify 
the public spending see (López López and Utrilla, 2000, 
Molero, 1998: pp. 183-214, Boletín Oficial del Estado, 1997, 
Corona and Diaz Álvarez, 1994) 
 
19. The grants between the different institutions within this level 
of government have been taken away.  
 
20. I have tried to use in this article, whenever it has been 
possible, statistics on real levels of spending in stead of the 
budgeted ones, because in Spain there is, mainly in the 
Central level of government, an important difference, at least 
until 1997, between these two statistical sources (some times, 
in this level of government, the final budget is around 20% 
bigger than the initial one) So, it is possible to reach a bigger 
accuracy in the outcomes using statistics on real levels of 
spending. To get more information about the differences 
between real and budgeted spending in Spain, see (Edo 
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Hernández, Pablos Escobar and Valiño Castro, 1996, 
Gonzánlez-Páramo, 1995, Barea and Dizy, 1995, Barea, 1995) 
 
21. In the regional level does not exist an important difference 
between real and budgeted spending, see, for instance 
(Dirección General de Coordinación con las Haciendas 
Territoriales, 1998: p. VII) 
 
22. These years are called "transition years", because some local 
administrations used the old classification and others the new 
one, so there was not global and consolidated information for 
the whole local level. 
 
23. The terms "functional group" and "function" refer to different 
steps in the presentation of the information in each of the 
functional classifications of spending. Tables 1, 2, and 3 show 
the lack of a direct relationship of these terms among the 
different classifications. 
 
24. In my thesis I also analyzed, for all government levels, the 
evolution of: "constant" pesetas, "current" pesetas, the inter-
yearly growth rate, and the cumulative yearly average growth 
rate. This article would be too long including all this 
information. 
 
25. The explanation is that year the Central Government decided 
to pay off in advance a bigger quantity of public debt, saving 
money for coming years. For this reason, spending on "public 
debt" was 35.13% respect to the total. 
 
26. These deficits was, at the same time, caused by the bigger 
grants to regional and local governments, mentioned above. 
 
27. Following this Pact, in Spain was presented in the Congress a 
General Law Project of Budgetary Stability (see BOE, 
February 9, 2001), trying to avoid deficits since year 2001.  
 
28. During these years the central level did not decrease its 
percentages on these expenditures, probably because of 
duplication of spending and the incapacity of the central 
government to reduce its expenditures on areas already 
transferred to the A.C. 
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29. See section three of this article for more information about the 
transference of competencies to this group of A.C. 
 
30. For the period 1989-1999: Asturias, Cantabria, Castilla-La 
Mancha, Castilla y León, Extremadura and Murcia. For the 
period 2000-2006: the same regions, with the exception of 
Cantabria. For more informatio, see (Comisión de las 
Comunidades Europeas, 1991, Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo 
Regional y Fondo de Cohesión, 2001) 
 
31. This regime is not a fixed one, but it changes every five years 
after the negotiation among the A.C. and the Central 
government. Nowadays the regime is for the period 1997-2001, 
and negotiations for the next one (2002-2006) are actively 
working. 
 
32. These theories were analyzed in section number 2 of this 
paper. 
 
33. The section number 2 of this paper showed how Musgrave's 
(1959) and Oates's (1972) classic Fiscal Federalism Theory still 
provides the most complete description of economic 
federalism. 
 
34. See section 3 of this paper. 
 
35. There is statistical information for "Foral diputations" since 
1988. Due of the inclusion of these local corporations, 
percentages on grants to other public administrations started 
to increase precisely that year (see appendix 5) 
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